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In recent years, a new institutionalist theory has emerged to explain the prevalence of informal sector 
entrepreneurship. This argues that formal institutional failures lead to the emergence of an asymmetry 
between the formal rules (laws and regulations) and the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs 
regarding the acceptability of participating in the informal sector, which in turn leads to the prevalence 
of informal entrepreneurship. The aim of this paper is to evaluate this social actor approach by 
reporting evidence from 453 face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 
entrepreneurs in FYR Macedonia. This reveals not only a significant association between participation 
in the informal economy and the non-DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVZLWKWKHIRUPDOUXOHVEXW
specific formal institutional failings that are significantly associated with the acceptability of informal 
entrepreneurship, namely poor quality public services, a lack of tax fairness, corruption and instability 
in the formal institutions. The theoretical and policy implications are then discussed. 
Keywords: Informal economy; entrepreneurship; tax morale; institutional theory; FYR Macedonia. 
1.   Introduction 
To explain informal sector entrepreneurship, the dominant approach for some half a 
century has been to view entrepreneurs participating in the informal sector as rational 
economic actors who do so when the pay-off is greater than the expected cost of being 
caught and punished (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, the recognition that many 
entrepreneurs do not participate in the informal sector even when the benefits outweigh the 
costs, has led to the emergence of a new social actor approach (Webb et al., 2009, 2013; 
Williams, 2018; Williams et al., 2017). Drawing inspiration from institutional theory 
(North, 1990), this social actor approach views informal sector entrepreneurship to be the 
result of entrepreneurs¶ ODFNRI³YHUWLFDOWUXVW,´PHDVXUHGE\DQRQ-alignment between their 
norms, values and beliefs regarding informality, and the laws and regulations of the formal 
institutions (Alm et al., 2010, 2012; Cummings et al., 2009; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; 
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Torgler, 2007, 2012; Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, b, 2016a, b). Therefore, the solution 
is to improve vertical trust. However, until now, most studies have discussed this lack of 
vertical trust in formal institutions in a generic manner. In this paper, the intention is to 
seek to identify the formal institutions in which there is a lack of trust and which 
institutional failings can be seen to lead to informal sector entrepreneurship.   
This paper advances the emergent social actor approach in three ways. First, and 
empirically, we report a survey that reveals the strong positive association between 
participation in informal entrepreneurship and the lack of vertical trust, measured by the 
non-alignment of entrepreneurs¶ views with the formal rules. Second, we advance the 
theoretical basis of this new institutional theory by moving beyond the previously 
discussed lack of trust in formal institutions and identifying more precisely the formal 
institutions in which they lack vertical trust, and therefore, result in informal sector 
entrepreneurship. Third and finally, and from a policy viewpoint, we pinpoint some of the 
formal institutional failings that need to be resolved to reduce the prevalence of informal 
entrepreneurship.  
To achieve this, section 2 reviews the previous literature on institutional theory to 
formulate hypotheses in relation to not only the association between institutional 
asymmetry and participation in informal entrepreneurship, but also the formal institutional 
failings that lead to this asymmetry. To test these, section 3 then reports the data used, 
namely the 2015 GREY survey of entrepreneurs in FYR Macedonia, involving 453 face-
to-face interviews. Section 4 then reports the findings, while section 5 summarizes the 
theoretical and policy implications.  
In this paper, informal sector entrepreneurship refers to starting up and/or owning and 
managing a business venture that does not register and/or declare some or all its sales to 
the authorities for tax, social insurance or labor law purposes, when it should do so 
(Ketchen et al., 2014; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2017). Viewed through an 
institutional lens, formal entrepreneurship is an entrepreneurial endeavor that adheres to 
the formal laws and regulations. In contrast, informal entrepreneurship is an entrepreneurial 
endeavor that takes place outside of the formal laws and regulations but within the norms, 
values and beliefs held by citizens and entrepreneurs regarding what is right and acceptable 
(Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck et al., 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al., 2009; Welter et 
al., 2015), while criminal entrepreneurship occurs outside of both the formal rules of the 
game as well as the socially shared rules of what is acceptable. 
2.   Informal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Theory: Literature Review and 
Hypotheses Development 
For nearly half a century, the rational economic actor approach proposed by Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) has been dominant when explaining entrepreneurship in the informal 
sector. This asserts that entrepreneurs participate in the informal sector when the pay-off is 
greater than the expected cost of being caught and punished. Therefore, to tackle informal 
entrepreneurship, most governments focus on increasing the actual and/or perceived level 
of punishments and likelihood of detection (e.g., ILO, 2017; Williams, 2014, 2018; 
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Williams and Puts, 2017). However, the evidence of the effectiveness of this approach is 
less than conclusive. Although some find that increasing penalties and the probability of 
detection reduces participation in the informal sector (Feld and Frey, 0DV¶XGet al., 
2015; Mazzolini et al., 2017), others find no significant association (Hartl et al., 2015; 
Shaw et al., 2008; Williams and Franic, 2015, 2016), and yet others find that increasing 
the actual and/or perceived deterrents leads to greater non-compliance (Hofmann et al., 
2017; Kaplanoglou and Rapano, 2015; Murphy, 2005, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007). 
Indeed, the most telling rebuttal of the rational economic actor approach is that many 
entrepreneurs do not participate in the informal sector even when the benefit/cost ratio 
suggests they should (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 
2007; Williams and Krasniqi, 2017, 2018).  
To explain this, a ³VRFLDODFWRU´DSSURDFKKDVHPHUJHG, which views entrepreneurs as 
more likely to participate in the informal sector if they possess low tax morale, by which 
is meant a low intrinsic motivation to pay taxes (Alm et al., 2012; Torgler, 2007a, 2012). 
In recent years, this theoretical perspective has drawn inspiration from institutional theory 
(North, 1990). Viewed through this lens, institutions are the rules of the game. All societies 
have not only formal institutions, which are laws and regulations that define the legal rules 
of the game, but also informal institutions, which are WKH³VRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
FKDQQHOV´ +HOPNH DQG /HYLWVN\, 2004). Therefore, tax morale describes the level of 
DOLJQPHQWRIFLWL]HQV¶YLHZVZLWKWKHIRUPDOUXOHV. As this gap or asymmetry widens, tax 
morale or vertical trust decreases and participation in the informal economy becomes more 
prevalent (Williams, 2018).  
Lower levels of tax morale/vertical trust have been found to be associated with lower 
levels of tax compliance (Brink and Porcano, 2016; Dell`Anno, 2009; Kirchgässner, 2010; 
Lima and Zaklan, 2008; Lisi, 2015; Stark and Kirchler, 2017; Sumartaya and Hafidiah, 
2014; Torgler, 2004a; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 2008), larger shadow 
economies (Halla, 2012; Torgler and Schneider, 2006, 2007a, b, 2009; Torgler et al., 
2007a, b), higher participation in the informal economy (Williams and Horodnic, 2015b, 
2016a; Windebank and Horodnic, 2017) and higher participation in salary under-reporting 
(Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, c, d, e, 2016b, 2017a). Indeed, a strong negative 
correlation has been identified between the non-alignment of citizens views with the formal 
rules and participation in the informal economy with Pearson r values between -.46 and -
.66 (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Torgler, 2011). For example, Torgler (2011) finds that in post-
socialist societies, when there is a decrease of tax morale by one unit, there is an increase 
in the informal economy of twenty percentage points. Whether a similar strong correlation 
exists between the non-DOLJQPHQW RI HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ YLHZV, the formal rules and 
participation in informal entrepreneurship can be here evaluated. Therefore, to evaluate 
this proposition, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
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Vertical trust hypothesis (H1): the greater is the non-DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ YLHZV
with the formal rules, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs participating in the 
informal sector.  
Therefore, what causes this non-DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ YLHZVZLWK WKH IRUPDO
rules, regarding the acceptability of participating in the informal economy? When 
analyzing citizens, rather than entrepreneurs, a large number of studies have found that the 
level of vertical trust of citizens in government depends on the perceived quality of public 
services and the level of satisfaction with public services (Williams, 2018; Williams and 
Horodnic, 2017a). For example, the level of vertical trust is positively correlated with the 
perceived effectiveness of government spending (Alasfour et al., 2016; Barone and 
Mocetti, 2011; Molero and Pujol, 2012; Sipos, 2015; Vythelingum et al., 2017); therefore, 
the quality of public services and government (Williams, 2018; Williams and Martinez, 
2017). To start to evaluate whether this is also the case when entrepreneurs are analyzed, 
the following hypothesis can be tested:  
Public service quality hypothesis (H2): the lower is the level of satisfaction with the quality 
of public services, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal 
rules. 
It is also the case that citizens who do not perceive the tax system as fair or taxes to be 
appropriately used by government tend to possess lower levels of vertical trust (Alasfour 
et al., 2016; Alm and Gomez, 2008; Çevik, 2016; Cummings et al., 2005, 2009; Cyan et 
al.)UH\1LHVLREĊG]ND, 2014; Torgler and Schaffner, 2007; Torgler et al., 
2008; Vythelingum et al., 2017). For example, vertical trust is low if there are seen to be 
resource misallocations and inefficiencies because of state capture. This is the process 
whereby firms or groups of firms influence the formulation of laws and other government 
policies to their own advantage through illicit or non-transparent means (Fries et al., 2003). 
The outcome is that they receive preferential treatment and state resources are diverted 
toward supporting them. For those who are not part of these elites who capture the 
resources of the state, the outcome is commonly overly burdensome taxes and relatively 
fewer public services in return for the taxes and social contributions they pay (De Soto, 
1989; Siqueira et al., 2016; Williams et al., 2016). Therefore, in countries where state 
capture prevails, citizens have little trust in public authorities and their vertical trust is low 
because the obligation of paying the taxes does not represent an accepted social norm 
because the citizens feel cheated (Chan et al., 2018; Saitta, 2017; Torgler, 2001; Torgler et 
al., 2007b). To start to evaluate whether this is also the case when entrepreneurs are 
analyzed, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
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Tax fairness hypothesis (H3): the lower is the perception that taxes are appropriately used 
by government, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal 
rules. 
Besides resource misallocations and inefficiencies, the presence of institutional voids 
resulting from the lack of quality of public services and state capture, there are also resource 
misallocations and inefficiencies that result from the existence of public sector corruption 
(Khan and Quaddus, 2015; Round et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010). The most common 
type of public sector FRUUXSWLRQLVWKHµPLVXVHRISXEOLFRIILFHIRUSULYDWHJDLQ¶6YHQVVRQ
2005). This is the practice whereby government officials demand or receive gifts, bribes 
and other payments (e.g., a portion of a given contract) from entrepreneurs and provide a 
service in return. This might include speeding up the granting of an operating license, not 
producing a negative outcome from a workplace inspection, or helping them avoid delays 
in some other regulatory process requiring the approval of public sector officials such as 
the granting of a construction permit. Such corruption not only leads to resource 
misallocations and inefficiencies, and acts as an additional tax formal entrepreneurs have 
to pay, but also arguably forces entrepreneurs into the informal sector to escape being 
subject to such extortion from public officials. To evaluate this, the following hypothesis 
can be tested: 
Public sector corruption hypothesis (H4): the greater the perceived level of public 
corruption, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules. 
A final formal institutional failing considered here relates to the perceived and/or 
actual instability and uncertainty of the formal rules. Formal institutional instability and 
uncertainty results from continuous changes in the formal laws and regulations (Levitsky 
and Murillo, 2009; Williams and Shahid, 2016). This is especially the case in many 
transition economies where entrepreneurs and enterprises witness continuous changes in 
the formal rules, so much so that they do not expect rules that apply today to remain in 
force in the future. For example, citizens and entrepreneurs in such countries see little point 
in paying compulsory contributory payments for pensions or social contributions so they 
can claim unemployment benefits because they do not believe, when in the future they may 
wish to benefit, the same rules will apply. Therefore, this perceived lack of permanency of 
the formal rules is a major problem for governments in engendering adherence to the 
formal rules. A further related problem is that there is often a widespread perception that 
the formal rules that exist are not indigenous to the country and/or are being imposed from 
the outside, such as by supra-national institutions (see Williams et al., 2013). In such 
situations, particularly when the laws and regulations are continuously changing, the 
outcome is that entrepreneurs and enterprises turn elsewhere for a more permanent set of 
values, norms and understandings. In these situations, populations and businesses turn to 
the informal institutions as a source of more permanent shared norms, values and beliefs 
in relation to what is acceptable and what is not to govern and structure their economic 
activities instead of relying on formal laws and regulations (London et al., 2014; Mair et 
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al., 2012), which can be very fluid and temporary in nature. To start to evaluate this, the 
following hypothesis can be tested: 
Instability of formal institutions hypothesis (H5): the greater is the perceived political 
instability, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules. 
3.   Data and Variables 
3.1.   Data 
To evaluate these hypotheses, data is reported from a representative survey of 
entrepreneurs conducted in 2015 in FYR Macedonia, a country where the informal 
economy is one of the largest in Europe (Medina and Schneider, 2018) and there is 
SXUSRUWHGWREHOLWWOHDOLJQPHQWEHWZHHQHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVUHJDUGLQJWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\
of participating in the informal economy and the formal rules (Ristovska, 2013). The 
sampling methodology ensured the samples are proportionate to the universe in the country 
with respect to firm size, region and sector. The owners or managers of a representative 
sample of 453 businesses were surveyed.  
Given the sensitive topic, it was necessary to develop rapport with the interviewees. 
Therefore, the survey did not start with sensitive questions. Instead, the interview schedule 
started by asking them questions about their satisfaction with the business environment, 
followed by questions on the acceptability of some uncompliant behaviors; only then were 
questions asked regarding whether they consider they are affected by the existence of the 
businesses that use informal practices and their engagement in such practices. Analyzing 
WKHLQWHUYLHZHUV¶UHVSRQVHVUHJDUGLQJWKHSHUFHLYHGUHOLDELOLW\RIWKHLQWHUYLHZVFRQGXFWHG
in 94 percent of cases, interviewers reported excellent or fair cooperation from the 
entrepreneurs. Cooperation was deemed bad, or the interviewer did not assess the perceived 
reliability of the interviews in only one percent of cases.  
3.2.   Variables 
To evaluate the hypotheses, we use ordered logit regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is a categorical variable showing the level of vertical trust of entrepreneurs. To 
measure the non-alignment of entrepreneurs¶ values, norms and beliefs on the acceptability 
of informality (³civic morale´) with the laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
³VWDWHPRUDOLW\´), the following question was asked: To what extent do you agree with the 
statements that underreporting annual revenue or turnover to evade taxes is acceptable. 
This variable is measured on a 10-point Likert scale where 1 means completely disagree 
and 10 means completely agree. In this paper, the 10-point scale has been recoded into a 
four-point scale (Torgler, 2004; Torgler and Schneider, 2009): value 1 = low tax morale 
(responses from 4 through 10); value 2 = middle lower tax morale (response 3); value 3 = 
middle upper tax morale (response 2); and value 4=high tax morale (response 1 
³completely disagree´ 
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Meanwhile, the key independent variables used to evaluate each hypothesis, are the 
following: 
x Participation in informal sector: a categorical variable showing how often employers 
KLUH DQ HPSOR\HH RQ D FRQWUDFW ZLWK ³KLGGHQ FODXVHV WKDW LV VRFLDO LQVXUDQFH DQG WD[
contributions are paid based on (for example) the minimum wage, while the rest of the pay 
LVSDLGXQGHFODUHGZLWKRXWDSD\VOLS´ QHver, 2 = sometimes, 3 = in most cases, 4 = 
always.  
x Satisfaction with the quality of public services: A categorical variable describing 
respondent¶s satisfaction with the quality of public services, related to the business 
activities in her/his country: value 1= very unsatisfied, value 2= unsatisfied, value 3= 
neither satisfied nor unsatisfied, value 4= satisfied, value 5= very satisfied. 
x Taxes are appropriately used by the government: A categorical variable recorded 
using the following survey question: To what extent do you agree with the statements that 
taxes are appropriately used by the government." This variable is measured on a 10-point 
Likert scale where 1 means completely disagree and 10 means completely agree. 
x Corruption as an obstacle to the current operations of the companies. A categorical 
variable recorded using the following survey question: To what degree is corruption an 
obstacle to the current operations of the companies: value 1=very severe obstacle, value 
2=major obstacle, value 3=moderate obstacle, value 4=minor obstacle, value 5=no 
obstacle.  
x Political instability as an obstacle to the current operations of the companies. A 
categorical variable recorded using the following survey question: To what degree is 
political instability an obstacle to the current operations of the companies: value 1=very 
severe obstacle, value 2=major obstacle, value 3=moderate obstacle, value 4=minor 
obstacle, value 5=no obstacle.  
A series of firm-level variables derived from previous studies analyzing the likelihood 
of participation in the informal economy (Ali and Najman, 2018; Hudson et al., 2012; 
3XWQLƼãDQG6DXND3XWQLƼãet al., 2018; Williams and Horodnic, 2017a,b) are used 
as control variables as detailed below: 
x Sector: A categorical variable describing the main activity of the company: 1 = 
agriculture, 2 = hotels and restaurants, 3 = services, 4 = construction, 5 = transport and 
communications, 6 = trade, 7 = retail, 8 = industry, 9 = health, 10 = other. 
x Number of employees: A categorical variable describing the total number of currently 
employed people in the observed company (excluding owners and partners): 1 = sole 
SURSULHWRU¶VDQGPLFUR-9 employees), 2 = small (10-49 employees), 3 = medium and 
large (50+ employees). 
x Legal Status: A categorical variable describing the legal status of observed company: 
1 = sole proprietorship, 2 = private limited company, limited by shares (LTD.), 3 = public 
Ltd Company (PLC), 4 = other. 
x Age business: A categorical variable showing how many years has the observed 
company been trading (this includes under all ownerships and all legal statuses): 1 = less 
than 5 years, 2 = 6-10 years, 3 = 11-20 years, 4 = more than 20 years. 
x Business locality: A categorical variable describing in what kind of locality does the 
observed company carry out its main activity: 1 = the capital, 2 = big city (regional center), 
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3 = small town, 4 = village or rural area, 5 = the entire country, 6 = both inside the country 
and outside the country, or outside the country only. 
x Vat registered: A dummy variable describing whether the respondent¶s company is 
VAT registered: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
For the descriptive analysis, we report the crude data for each variable to provide an 
accurate description and to minimize the bias that one would encounter by excluding those 
entrepreneurs who did not provide responses to all the variables in the analysis but provided 
responses for some questions. On the other hand, only those respondents for which data on 
each variable was available for each model were analyzed in the regression analysis 
because of the technical requirements of this type of analysis. Answers of ³GRQ¶WNQRZ´ 
and ³refusal´ have been eliminated in all estimations. Accordingly, an ordered logit model 
without multiple imputations was developed. 
4.   Results 
7DEOHSUHVHQWVWKHGHVFULSWLYHUHVXOWVRIWKHDOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVZLWKWKH
formal rules in FYR Macedonia on the unacceptability of informality. This reveals that 
overall 31.9 percent have a low level of alignment with the formal rules on the 
unacceptability of informality, and strongly agree that it is acceptable to underreport annual 
revenue or turnover to evade taxes, 7.4 percent lower middle alignment with state morale, 
6.5 percent upper middle alignment with state morale and 54.3 percent have a high 
alignment with state morale, completely disagreeing that it is acceptable to underreport 
annual revenue or turnover to evade taxes. However, the level of alignment of 
entrepreneurs with the formal rules varies across various firm-level characteristics. 
Starting with whether entrepreneurs participate in informal practices, the finding is that 
there appears to be an association between those highly aligned with state morale and their 
level of participation in informal practices. 43.6 percent of those who, in most cases or 
always, use informal practices strongly agree that it is acceptable to underreport annual 
revenue or turnover to evade taxes, but only 32.5 percent of those who sometimes use 
informal practices and just 26.5 percent of those who never use informal practices. 
Moreover, the degree to which entrepreneurs align with state morale markedly varies 
across sectors. Those in agriculture, transport and communications, and construction have 
a high alignment with the formal rules, and those in the retail and trade sectors for example, 
have a lower alignment with state morale. Similarly, sole traders and micro-enterprises 
have a lower alignment with state morale than entrepreneurs operating small and medium-
size businesses, as do sole proprietors compared with those entrepreneurs operating 
businesses with other forms of legal status. Furthermore, entrepreneurs operating younger 
enterprises appear to have a lower alignment with state morale than those operating older 
more established businesses, as do those operating businesses in the capital and larger 
urban areas. VAT registration appears to have no influence. 
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Table 1. Alignment of entrepreneurs with the formal rules on the unacceptability of informality in 
FYR Macedonia: by firm-level characteristics and views of formal institutions 
% of survey respondents Low 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Lower 
middle 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Upper 
middle 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
High 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Total 31.9 7.4 6.5 54.3 
Participation in informal practices     
 Never 26.5 9.1 7.4 57.0 
 Sometimes 32.5 5.7 9.6 52.2 
 In most cases/ always 43.6 5.9 2.0 48.5 
Sector     
 Agriculture 5.6 0.0 0.0 94.4 
 Hotels and restaurants 45.2 6.5 12.9 35.5 
 Services 24.1 13.8 8.6 53.5 
 Construction 34.5 0.0 3.5 62.1 
 Transport and communications 11.9 7.1 4.8 76.2 
 Trade 40.8 10.5 9.2 39.5 
 Retail 32.1 6.2 3.7 58.0 
 Industry 42.6 9.3 5.6 42.6 
 Health 48.0 0.0 8.0 44.0 
 Other 10.5 5.3 5.3 79.0 
Number of employees     
 Sole traders and micro (0-9 employees) 34.0 7.4 6.4 52.3 
 Small (10-49 employees) 15.6 8.9 6.7 68.9 
 Medium and large (50+ employees) 27.3 0.0 9.1 63.6 
Legal status     
 Sole proprietorship 61.2 7.5 4.5 26.9 
 
Private limited company, limited by shares 26.2 7.9 7.2 58.6 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC) 36.4 9.1 4.6 50.0 
 
Other 4.8 0.0 9.5 85.7 
Age of business     
 Less than 5 years 38.6 1.2 3.6 56.6 
 6 - 10 years 39.5 10.1 4.7 45.7 
 11 - 20 years 26.1 8.5 9.2 56.3 
 More than 20 years 22.1 7.8 6.5 63.6 
Business locality     
 The capital 48.4 12.9 9.7 29.0 
 Big city (regional centre) 34.4 5.9 5.0 54.8 
 Small town 23.5 6.2 8.6 61.7 
 Village or rural area 33.3 0.0 25.0 41.7 
 The entire country 16.2 8.1 2.7 73.0 
 
Both inside the country and outside the 
country, or outside the country only 15.0 15.0 0.0 70.0 
Vat registered     
 No 31.5 6.9 8.2 53.4 
 Yes 31.7 7.8 6.3 54.2 
Satisfaction with the quality of public services     
 Very unsatisfied 57.7 0.0 3.9 38.5 
 Unsatisfied 27.4 7.6 6.6 58.5 
 Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied 37.5 5.5 4.7 52.3 
 Satisfied 27.1 10.3 8.4 54.2 
 Very satisfied 22.2 11.1 0.0 66.7 
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Table 1 (continued). Alignment of entrepreneurs with the formal rules on the unacceptability of 
informality in FYR Macedonia: by firm-level characteristics and views of formal institutions 
% of survey respondents Low 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Lower 
middle 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Upper 
middle 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
High 
alignment 
with state 
morale 
Taxes appropriately used by government     
 Completely disagree 39.1 2.9 1.5 56.5 
 2 and 3 41.4 6.9 3.5 48.3 
 4 and 5 39.5 7.8 8.5 44.2 
 6 and 7 28.8 12.1 10.6 48.5 
 8 and 9 23.5 8.8 5.9 61.8 
 Completely agree 16.1 0.0 0.0 83.9 
Corruption an obstacle to current operations     
 Very severe obstacle 58.1 3.2 6.5 32.3 
 Major obstacle 39.7 11.8 5.9 42.7 
 Moderate obstacle 33.3 8.0 13.3 45.3 
 Minor obstacle 35.6 6.8 6.8 50.9 
 No obstacle 23.0 6.2 3.4 67.4 
Political instability obstacle to operations     
 Very severe obstacle 41.9 6.5 9.7 41.9 
 Major obstacle 38.9 6.9 1.4 52.8 
 Moderate obstacle 51.8 7.2 9.6 31.3 
 Minor obstacle 25.5 14.6 5.5 54.6 
 No obstacle 20.6 5.6 7.2 66.7 
Source: AXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ in FYROM 
However, there is a marked association between the satisfaction of entrepreneurs with 
the quality of public services and their level of alignment with state morale in terms of the 
unacceptability of informal practices. Some 57.7 percent of those very unsatisfied with the 
quality of public services have a low alignment with state morale on the unacceptability of 
informal practices compared with just 22.2 percent of those who are very satisfied with the 
quality of public services. Similarly, 39.1 percent of those who completely disagree that 
taxes are appropriately used by the government have a low alignment with state morale on 
informality, but only 16.1 percent of those who completely agree that taxes are 
appropriately used by the government. There also appears to be close association between 
perceptions of corruption and the alignment of entrepreneurs with state morale on the 
unacceptability of informality. Some 58.1 percent of those who perceive corruption as a 
very severe obstacle to the current operations of their business have a low alignment with 
state morale on informality, but only 23 percent of those who do not perceive corruption 
as an obstacle to the current operations of their business. And finally, 41.9 percent of those 
entrepreneurs who perceive political instability as a very severe obstacle to the current 
operations of their business have a low alignment with state morale on informality but only 
those 20.6 percent of those who do not perceive political instability as an obstacle.  
However, these are descriptive statistics. They do not hold constant the other variables 
that may influence these correlations. To do so, Table 2 presents an ordered logit regression 
analysis. This adopts a staged approach. Model 1 considers solely the level of non-
alignment of entrepreneurs across various firm-level variables. Model 2 then adds in the 
variable of participation in the informal economy to see if HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶QRQ-alignment 
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with the formal rules is associated with participation in the informal economy. To evaluate 
the various formal institutional determinants that lead to this non-alignment of 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ YLHZV ZLWK WKH IRUPDO UXOHV model 3 then adds in the variable of their 
satisfaction with the quality of public services, model 4 their views on whether taxes are 
appropriately used by the government, model 5 their views on whether public sector 
corruption is an obstacle to the current operations of their business, and model 6 their views 
on whether political instability is an obstacle to the current operations of their business.  
Starting with the level of non-DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVZLWKWKHIRUPDOUXOHV
according to firm-level variables, model 1 in Table 2a reveals that the alignment with the 
formal rules is significantly lower for entrepreneurs working in hotels and restaurants than 
for entrepreneurs operating in the construction sector, but entrepreneurs¶ alignment with 
the formal rules is greater in the agriculture sector and transport and communications than 
for entrepreneurs operating in the construction sector. Interestingly, when other variables 
DUHKHOGFRQVWDQWWKHUHLVQRGLIIHUHQFHLQHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VDOLJQPHQWZLWKWKHIRUPDOUXOHV
by the number of employees employed (i.e., firm size). However, there are significant 
variations by the legal status of the business. Entrepreneurs who are sole proprietors are 
significantly less aligned with the formal rules than entrepreneurs operating private limited 
companies and public limited companies. So too are entrepreneurs operating businesses six 
to ten years old significantly less aligned to the formal rules than those operating younger 
business ventures (less than five years old), and those operating in the capital are 
significantly less aligned with the formal rules than those operating in small towns, as are 
those who are VAT registered significantly less aligned to the formal rules than those who 
are not.  
Model 2 in Table 2a adds in the variable of participation in the informal economy. The 
first important finding is that the significance and direction of association remains the same 
on almost all the firm-level characteristics. The additional finding is that there is a 
significant association between the level of adherence to the formal rules and the likelihood 
of engaging in informal economic practices. Those entrepreneurs who are less aligned to 
the formal rules are significantly more likely to engage in informal economic activity 
(confirming hypothesis H1). Indeed, a one unit increase in the scale measuring 
participation in the informal sector worsens by 7.7 percentage points the proportion of 
entrepreneurs indicating the highest level of alignment with the formal rules. 
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Table 2a. Estimation results from the ordered logit regression 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Marginal 
effect  
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Marginal 
effect  
Sector (RC: Construction)     
 Agriculture  2.977 (1.195)**  0.418  2.730 (1.227)**  0.407 
 Hotels and restaurants -1.060 (0.569)* -0.202 -1.106 (0.619)* -0.201 
 Services  0.304 (0.508)  0.061  0.448 (0.570)  0.087 
 Transport and communications  1.165 (0.593)**  0.219  1.244 (0.652)*  0.230 
 Trade -0.106 (0.485) -0.021 -0.002 (0.528)  0.000 
 Retail  0.448 (0.500)  0.089  0.251 (0.548)  0.049 
 Industry -0.257 (0.522) -0.052 -0.142 (0.578) -0.028 
 Health -17.021 (1117.371) -0.468 -15.689 (604.351) -0.449 
 Other  1.195 (0.837)  0.224  1.777 (1.014)*  0.308 
Number of employees (RC: Sole 
traders and micro (0-9 employees))   
  
 Small (10-49 employees)  0.486 (0.394)  0.091 0.168 (0.425) 0.031 
 Medium and large (50+ employees)  0.447 (0.796)  0.084 0.114 (0.817) 0.021 
Legal status (RC: Sole 
proprietorship)     
 
Private limited company, limited by 
shares (LTD.)  1.669 (0.335)***  0.317 1.331 (0.351)*** 0.251 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC)  0.808 (0.438)*  0.146 0.397 (0.482) 0.071 
 
Other  20.596 (1117.371)  0.731 19.032 (604.352) 0.689 
Operating period (RC: Less than 5 
years)     
 6 - 10 years -0.748 (0.338)** -0.141 -0.948 (0.359)*** -0.175 
 11 - 20 years -0.268 (0.337) -0.050 -0.417 (0.356) -0.076 
 More than 20 years -0.011 (0.377) -0.002 -0.111 (0.410) -0.020 
Business locality (RC: Small town)     
 The capital -1.413 (0.430)*** -0.265 -1.865 (0.478)*** -0.335 
 Big city (regional centre) -0.249 (0.295) -0.047 -0.538 (0.321)* -0.100 
 Village or rural area -1.531 (0.791)* -0.285 -1.806 (0.806)** -0.326 
 The entire country  0.197 (0.483)  0.036  0.188 (0.542)  0.033 
 
Both inside the country and outside 
the country, or outside the country 
only 
-0.262 (0.594) -0.050 -0.188 (0.693) -0.034 
Vat registered -0.688 (0.307)** -0.129 -0.519 (0.322) -0.095 
Participation in informal economy   -0.417 (0.166)*** -0.077 
Number of observations 412 359 
Pseudo R2 0.152 0.164 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Tax morale measured on a four-point scale (1=Low tax morale; 
2=Mid low tax morale; 3=Mid high tax morale; 4=High tax morale) 
(2) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the tax morale index (4) 
(3) Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: AXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ in FYROM 
To begin evaluating the various formal institutional determinants that lead to this non-
DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVZLWKWKHIRUPDOUXOHV, model 3 in Table 2b adds in the 
variable of their satisfaction with the quality of public services. Again, the significance and 
direction of association remains the same on almost all the firm-level characteristics. The 
additional finding is that there is a significant association between the adherence of 
HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ YLHZV WR WKH IRUPDO UXOHV and their perceptions of the quality of public 
services. The lower is the level of satisfaction with the quality of public services, the 
significantly greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules 
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(confirming Hypothesis H2). An increase by one unit in satisfaction with the quality of 
public services improves by 4.2 percentage points the proportion of entrepreneurs 
indicating the highest level of alignment with the formal rules. 
Meanwhile, model 4 adds in the variable of whether they view taxes as appropriately 
used by the government. Again, the significance and direction of association remains the 
same on near enough all the firm-level characteristics. The additional finding is that there 
LVDVLJQLILFDQWDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHDGKHUHQFHRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVWRWKHIRUPDO
rules and their perceptions of whether taxes are appropriately used by government. The 
lower is the perception that taxes are appropriately used by government, the significantly 
greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules (confirming 
Hypothesis H3). An increase by one unit in the perception that taxes are appropriately used 
by government improves by 2.4 percentage points the proportion of entrepreneurs 
indicating the highest level of alignment with the formal rules. 
Model 5 in Table 2c examines their views on whether public sector corruption is an 
obstacle to the current operations of their business and whether this is associated with their 
adherence to the formal rules regarding the unacceptability of informality. The finding is 
that the greater the perceived level of public corruption, the greater is the likelihood of 
entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules (confirming Hypothesis H4). A decrease by 
RQHXQLWLQDQHQWUHSUHQHXU¶VSHUFHSWLRQWKDWFRUUXSWLRQLVDQREVWDFOHWRWKHLURSHUDWLRQV
improves by 6.1 percentage points the proportion of entrepreneurs indicating the highest 
level of alignment with the formal rules. 
Finally, model 6 in Table 2c explores whether perceived political instability is 
associated with entrepreneurs¶ views on adhering to the formal rules regarding the 
unacceptability of informality. The finding is that the greater is the perceived political 
instability, the greater is the likelihood of entrepreneurs not adhering to the formal rules 
(confirming Hypothesis H5). A decrease by one unit in the perception of entrepreneurs that 
political instability is an obstacle to their current operations improves by 3.9 percentage 
points the proportion of entrepreneurs indicating the highest level of alignment with the 
formal rules. 
  
14 Williams and Bezeredi 
 
Table 2b. Estimation results from the ordered logit regression 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Margin
al 
effect 
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Marginal 
effect 
Sector (RC: Construction)     
 Agriculture  2.968 (1.182)**  0.421  3.170 (1.208)***  0.462 
 Hotels and restaurants -0.917 (0.580) -0.174 -0.676 (0.602) -0.121 
 Services  0.434 (0.524)  0.086  0.731 (0.550)  0.139 
 Transport and communications  1.246 (0.602)**  0.232  1.408 (0.638)**  0.258 
 Trade -0.143 (0.502) -0.029  0.081 (0.513)  0.015 
 Retail  0.442 (0.516)  0.087  0.659 (0.526)  0.125 
 Industry -0.320 (0.542) -0.063 -0.095 (0.572) -0.018 
 Health -15.408 (524.160) -0.458 -15.873 (717.777) -0.412 
 Other  1.292 (0.842)  0.239  1.616 (0.887)*  0.291 
Number of employees (RC: Sole traders 
and micro (0-9 employees))   
  
 Small (10-49 employees)  0.626 (0.403)  0.115  0.734 (0.422)*  0.130 
 Medium and large (50+ employees)  0.479 (0.800)  0.089 -0.040 (0.913) -0.007 
Legal status (RC: Sole proprietorship)     
 
Private limited company, limited by 
shares (LTD.)  1.675 (0.340)***  0.314  1.584 (0.352)***  0.289 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC)  0.786 (0.404)*  0.140  0.631 (0.469)  0.109 
 
Other  18.924 (524.161)  0.731  19.505 (717.778)  0.714 
Operating period (RC: Less than 5 
years)     
 6 - 10 years -0.583 (0.346)* -0.109 -0.671 (0.360)* -0.121 
 11 - 20 years -0.094 (0.345) -0.017 -0.189 (0.355) -0.034 
 More than 20 years  0.023 (0.385)  0.004  0.000 (0.399)  0.000 
Business locality (RC: Small town)     
 The capital -1.572 (0.442)*** -0.288 -1.569 (0.468)*** -0.281 
 Big city (regional centre) -0.285 (0.298) -0.053 -0.401 (0.320) -0.073 
 Village or rural area -1.545 (0.805)* -0.284 -1.486 (0.808)* -0.267 
 The entire country  0.132 (0.490)  0.024  0.284 (0.538)  0.049 
 
Both inside the country and outside the 
country, or outside the country only -0.312 (0.600) -0.058  0.140 (0.699)  0.025 
Vat registered -0.700 (0.314)** -0.130 -1.022 (0.338)*** -0.183 
Satisfaction with the quality of public 
services  0.227** (0.120)  0.042   
Taxes are appropriately used by the 
government    0.132 (0.046)***  0.024 
Number of observations 404 371 
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.178 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Tax morale measured on a four-point scale (1=Low tax morale; 
2=Mid low tax morale; 3=Mid high tax morale; 4=High tax morale) 
(2) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the tax morale index (4) 
(3) Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: AXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ in FYROM 
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Table 2c. Estimation results from the ordered logit regression 
 Model 5 Model 6 
 Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Marginal 
effect  
Coefficient 
(Standard error) 
Marginal 
effect 
Sector (RC: Construction)     
 Agriculture  2.900 (1.204)**  0.412  2.765 (1.211)**  0.391 
 Hotels and restaurants -1.419 (0.624)** -0.244 -1.212 (0.582)** -0.226 
 Services  0.320 (0.550)  0.061  0.214 (0.520)  0.042 
 Transport and communications  1.140 (0.618)*  0.206  0.958 (0.598)  0.178 
 Trade  0.019 (0.524)  0.004 -0.123 (0.494) -0.024 
 Retail  0.631 (0.541)  0.119  0.400 (0.508)  0.078 
 Industry  0.002 (0.572)  0.000 -0.375 (0.535) -0.074 
 Health -15.478 (536.687) -0.453 -14.602 (370.085) -0.481 
 Other  1.366 (0.859)  0.242  1.237 (0.843)  0.223 
Number of employees (RC: Sole traders 
and micro (0-9 employees))     
 Small (10-49 employees)  0.365 (0.415)  0.065  0.480 (0.399)  0.088 
 Medium and large (50+ employees) -0.173 (0.842) -0.031  0.128 (0.834)  0.024 
Legal status (RC: Sole proprietorship)     
 
Private limited company, limited by 
shares (LTD.)  1.682 (0.360)***  0.309  1.717 (0.345)***  0.321 
 
Public Ltd Company (PLC)  0.639 (0.463)  0.111  0.677 (0.456)  0.118 
 
Other  19.268 (536.688)  0.721  17.946 (370.086)  0.734 
Operating period (RC: Less than 5 
years)     
 6 - 10 years -0.792 (0.361)** -0.141 -0.805 (0.348)** -0.151 
 11 - 20 years -0.347 (0.357) -0.061 -0.304 (0.345) -0.056 
 More than 20 years -0.027 (0.402) -0.005  0.035 (0.387)  0.006 
Business locality (RC: Small town)     
 The capital -1.347 (0.447)*** -0.244 -1.284 (0.444)*** -0.241 
 Big city (regional centre) -0.371 (0.313) -0.067 -0.280 (0.305) -0.053 
 Village or rural area -1.579 (0.811)* -0.284 -1.553 (0.803)* -0.286 
 The entire country  0.116 (0.529)  0.020  0.161 (0.488)  0.029 
 
Both inside the country and outside the 
country, or outside the country only -0.278 (0.605) -0.050 -0.163 (0.601) -0.030 
Vat registered -0.594 (0.33)* -0.106 -0.752 (0.313)** -0.140 
Corruption as an obstacle to the current 
operations of the companies  0.341 (0.088)***  0.061   
Political instability as an obstacle to the 
current operations of the companies    0.209 (0.085)**  0.039 
Number of observations 390 401 
Pseudo R2 0.176 0.159 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable: Tax morale measured on a four-point scale (1=Low tax morale; 
2=Mid low tax morale; 3=Mid high tax morale; 4=High tax morale) 
(2) We report the marginal effects for the highest score of the tax morale index (4) 
(3) Significance: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Source: AXWKRUV¶RZQZRUNEDVHGRQWKH*5(<6XUYH\ in FYROM 
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5.   Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has evaluated a new institutionalist theory, which argues that formal 
institutional failures lead to the emergence of an asymmetry between the formal rules (laws 
DQGUHJXODWLRQVDQGHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVUHJDUGLQJ WKHDFFHSWDELOLty of participating in 
the informal sector, which in turn leads to the prevalence of informal entrepreneurship. 
Reporting face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 453 
entrepreneurs in FYR Macedonia, not only is a significant association identified between 
participation in the informal economy and the non-DOLJQPHQWRIHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVZLWK
the formal rules, but some specific formal institutional failings are identified that lead to 
this asymmetry between their views and the formal rules. 
Therefore, in terms of theoretical implications, this paper makes three advances. First, 
most studies explaining participation in the informal economy from this emergent social 
actor approach grounded in institutional theory have focused on citizens or employees¶ 
level of adherence to the formal rules regarding the unacceptability of informality. Few 
have evaluated the level of entrepreneurs¶non-alignment with the formal rules. This paper 
has filled this lacuna in South-Eastern Europe. Second, by revealing there is a strong 
association between SDUWLFLSDWLQJ LQ WKH LQIRUPDO HFRQRP\ DQG HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ QRQ-
alignment with the formal rules, it confirms the usefulness of an institutional theory lens. 
The greater the degree of asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal 
institutions and the norms, values and beliefs of entrepreneurs, the greater is the prevalence 
of informal entrepreneurship. Finally, and importantly for further advancing institutional 
theory, some of the formal institutional failures that lead to this lack of adherence to the 
IRUPDOUXOHVDUHLGHQWLILHG7KHUHLVDVLJQLILFDQWDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶OHYHO
of adherence to the formal rules and their perceptions of the quality of public services, tax 
fairness, public sector corruption and instability in the formal institutions.   
Turning to the implications for policy, this paper reveals that at a minimum, there is a 
need to complement the dominant rational economic actor policy approach, which seeks to 
increase the penalties and probability of detection with policy measures to improve the 
DOLJQPHQWEHWZHHQHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVRIWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\RILQIRUPDOLW\DQGWKHIRUPDO
rules. To do so, the first approach that can be used is to alter HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVregarding 
the acceptability of informality using tax education and awareness raising campaigns (e.g., 
by providing information about the benefits of operating in the formal economy and 
showing the public goods and services received for the taxes paid). Nevertheless, it is 
DUJXDEOHWKDWHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶YLHZVRQWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\RILQIRUPDOLW\ZLOOQRWFKDQJHXQWLO
there are alterations in the formal institutions. On the other hand, formal institutions need 
to be altered. As the ordered logit regression analysis reveals, this requires, at a minimum, 
improvements in the quality of public services, greater tax fairness, reduced public sector 
corruption and greater stability in the formal institutions and rules of the game.  
Despite these theoretical and policy implications, this paper has its limitations. First, it 
reports results for only one country. Therefore, future research needs to evaluate whether 
similar associations are identified when conducting entrepreneur surveys in other nations. 
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Second, although this study reveals that the propensity of entrepreneurs to operate in the 
informal economy is significantly associated with their degree of non-alignment to the 
formal rules, it only uncovers some of the formal institutional failings that lead to this lack 
of adherence to the formal rules. Therefore, future quantitative, as well as in-depth 
qualitative research, is required to more systematically evaluate the types of formal 
institutional failings that lead to this lack of adherence so government can pursue more 
targeted policy measures to improve the level of trust between entrepreneurs and 
government. 
,QVXPWKLVSDSHUKDVUHYHDOHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKH³VRFLDODFWRU´DSSURDFKgrounded 
in institutional theory in explaining and tackling informal entrepreneurship in FYR 
Macedonia. If this paper stimulates similar research in other countries and more in-depth 
research on the formal institutional failings that lead to this lack of adherence, then it will 
have fulfilled a primary intention. If this then leads to changes in how informal 
entrepreneurship is tackled and greater emphasis on addressing the low the levels of 
vertical trust that lead to higher levels of informal entrepreneurship, then it will have 
fulfilled its fuller intention.  
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